THE EFFECTS OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND HEURISTIC CUES ON CHOICE

BY

MANUEL C. PONTES

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Dedicated to my wife, Nancy, who patiently encouraged and supported me throughout this endeavor, and to my parents, who always encouraged me in my pursuit of knowledge.

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By

MANUEL C. PONTES

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Chairman: Joseph W. Alba
Major Department: Marketing

Previous research has shown that accountability leads to greater decision involvement and more systematic information processing. Research has also shown that decision makers who process information more systematically make better decisions because they are not as easily influenced by heuristic cues. Taken together, these results suggest that accountable decision makers should make better decisions and should not be as easily influenced by heuristic cues. In contrast, this dissertation hypothesizes that accountable decision makers may make worse choices and be more influenced by heuristic cues, such as brand names or market shares, because they seek the approval of their audience. The first experiment supported this hypothesis and showed that accountable decision makers made worse choices; that is, subjects were less likely to choose an unknown brand name or a brand with a low market share even when it possessed the most compelling attributes. The second experiment examined the effects of accountability on the use of brand names when decision makers were informed that members of their audience had conflicting preferences. Others have suggested that accountability to an audience characterized by conflicting views may lead to better decision making. In contrast, the pattern of choices made by subjects in this experiment was similar to that in the first experiment; in both experiments, accountable decision makers were less likely to choose the best alternative. Also, subjects in these experiments believed that heuristic cues (brand names or market shares) were predictive of the choices of other people. It appears that accountable subjects opted for alternatives that either provided a justifiable rationale or that matched the presumed preferences of their audience.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Despite the enormous amount of attention devoted to the study of how individuals make decisions, most research has ignored the basic fact that many of these decisions are made in social and organizational settings. In such settings, individuals are often accountable for their decisions. Social systems and organizations develop shared rules, norms, and social practices (Tetlock, 1985a) and often regulate the behavior of their members with enforcement mechanisms, such as accountability, that are dependent on the need for social approval (Schlenker, 1980, 1982). Thus, accountability provides a link between individual decision makers and the organizations to which they belong (Tetlock, 1985a). When people are accountable, they seek approval from audiences for their decisions. As a result, their behavior is constrained by the rationales that their audiences are willing to accept. Failure to behave in ways for which one can provide acceptable rationales may lead to blame and punishment. Conversely, behavior for which one can construct acceptable accounts may lead to approval and reward (Schlenker, 1980, 1982; Scott and Lyman, 1968; Tetlock, 1985a). As a result, accountable decision makers are prone to behave like politicians; that is, they carefully consider the wishes and preferences of their audience and make choices that the audience is likely to support and endorse (Tetlock, 1985a).

Accountability is widely prevalent in marketing situations. For example, consumers are implicitly accountable for decisions that affect other individuals. As a result, accountability exists in family and household decision making as well as in gift-giving situations. Nevertheless, it is in organizational, managerial, and political situations that accountability is especially pervasive because decision makers must justify their decisions prior to implementation. This dissertation examines the effects of accountability on choice when heuristic cues such as brand names and market shares are present. The central premise of this research is that although accountability motivates people to be more thoughtful, it paradoxically may lead to worse decision outcomes when such cues are present.

Chapter 2 of this dissertation presents a review of the literature pertaining to the effects of accountability and involvement on decision making. It provides a discussion of why accountability may differ from other incentives and culminates in a hypothesis about the differential effects of accountability and involvement on decision making. Chapter 3 describes an experiment that is used to test the hypothesis. Chapter 4 describes a follow-up experiment that serves to clarify and extend the results of the first experiment. Finally, Chapter 5 provides a general discussion of the results and their implications.

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF LITERATURE

Effects of Accountability: Prior Research

The effects of accountability on information processing are contingent on whether the views of the accountable audience are known (Tetlock, 1985a). When the accountable decision maker knows the preferences of the audience, the simplest way to cope is to follow the audience's wishes (Klimoski and Inks, 1990; Tetlock, 1985a). For example, managers are likely to do what their bosses want them to do; consumers are likely to buy what their spouses want them to buy. The use of this heuristic, labeled the Acceptability heuristic (Tetlock, 1985a), is advantageous because the heuristic is easy to use and the audience is likely to provide approval and rewards for decisions that it favors.

On the other hand, when an accountable decision maker does not know the predispositions of the audience, the Acceptability heuristic cannot be used. In such cases, accountability motivates decision makers to engage in more integrative information processing and make more data-driven decisions. As a result, these decision makers typically examine more information, process information more deeply, and consider all aspects of a decision so that it can be defended regardless of the audience's desires. Indeed, Tetlock (1985a, pg. 310) claims that accountability to an audience of unknown views motivates people to become "more vigilant, complex, and self-critical information processors" who engage in greater "preemptive self-criticism" and ultimately make better decisions.

Ample empirical evidence exists to support this assertion. For example, Kruglanski and Freund (1983) asked subjects to evaluate the quality of an essay that was purportedly written by an eighth-grade student. Subjects who expected that their evaluations of the essay would be discussed in class and compared to those performed by a teacher were less influenced by the ethnic origin of the student than were subjects who did not expect that their evaluations would be discussed in class. Sanbonmatsu and Fazio (1990) also showed that accountable decision makers are more data-driven. In their experiment, they presented subjects with information about several departments of two stores and asked subjects to form overall evaluations of the stores. Subsequently, they asked subjects to evaluate the individual camera departments. Results showed that accountable decision makers were more likely to rely on specific information about the actual camera departments; nonaccountable decision makers, on the other hand, were more likely to rely on their overall evaluations of the stores, which were nondiagnostic. Thus, in these cases, accountability led to use of more relevant data and to less theory-driven decisions.

Research by Tetlock and his coworkers has shown that accountability often leads to more thorough information processing. For example, Tetlock (1983a) asked subjects to report their thoughts about controversial social issues. Subjects who expected to justify their decision to an audience of unknown views reported more moderate attitudes than subjects whose opinions were anonymous. Thought-listing protocols showed that accountable subjects processed information more deeply, considered multiple aspects of the issues, and engaged in greater preemptive self-criticism. The tendency to engage in more complex thought was correlated with the tendency to report more moderate attitudes. Similar results were also obtained by Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger (1989).

Tetlock and Kim (1987) showed that accountability may improve decision accuracy. They presented subjects with the actual responses that three persons had made to 16 items drawn from a personality test. After subjects had examined the responses, they were asked to predict the responses that these three persons had made to an additional set of 16 items. The results showed that accountable decision makers predicted more accurately the responses to the personality test and were less overconfident about the accuracy of their predictions.

Research has also shown that accountable decision makers are likely to use more analytic decision strategies. For example, Cvetkovich (1978) examined the ability of subjects to identify the relative weights they applied to task dimensions of gambling decisions. The results showed that subjects who were accountable for their betting decisions reported subjective weights that were considerably closer to the objective weights (determined by regression analysis) than did subjects who were not accountable. Hagafors and Brehmer (1983) showed that accountable subjects were more consistent in the use of rules that they had learned about relationships among variables than were nonaccountable subjects. These experiments show that accountability leads to greater awareness of the inputs used in decision making and to greater consistency in the use of decision rules (Tetlock, 1985a). In summary, accountability to an audience of unknown views results in greater mental effort, more analytic decision strategies, less theory-driven information processing, and, in most cases, better decisions.

Effects of Involvement: Prior Research

Consistent with the effects of accountability, independent research has shown that decision makers process information more systematically when they are more involved with the decision (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken, Liberman and Eagly, 1989). Subjects who receive messages on topics that are personally relevant are motivated to examine all information systematically for its relevance and importance, elaborate more fully, and weigh competing cues more properly when making judgments. In general, subjects who are highly motivated show greater sensitivity to argument quality and argument valence, and have higher scores on measures such as reading time, argument recall, and message-relevant cognition (Axsom, Yates and Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken, 1980; Leippe and Elkin, 1987; Maheswaran, Mackie and Chaiken, 1992; Petty and Cacioppo, 1984; Petty, Cacioppo and Schumann, 1983).

When decisions are unimportant, however, decision makers are less motivated to process all information systematically. In such cases, they typically use cues as simple decision heuristics (Axsom et al., 1987; Chaiken, 1980; Maheswaran and Chaiken, 1991; Petty and Cacioppo, 1984; Petty, Cacioppo and Goldman, 1981; Petty et al., 1983). These cues include source expertise and attractiveness, message length, number of arguments, and consensus information. On the other hand, when decision makers are highly motivated and able to process systematically, the influence of heuristic cues is generally low (Chaiken and Stangor, 1987; Petty and Cacioppo, 1984, 1986).

Thus, high involvement results in better decisions, and appears to have similar effects as accountability. In fact, researchers originally considered the effects of involvement resulting from decision importance to be essentially the same as the effects of involvement resulting from accountability (McAllister, Mitchell, and Beach, 1979; Chaiken, 1980). The empirical results to date also seem to indicate that both sources of motivation lead to more data-driven information processing and to better decision outcomes.

Is Accountability Merely Another Form of Decision Importance?

Despite the lack of evidence to the contrary, it may be premature to conclude that the effects of accountability are isomorphic to those of other incentives that increase involvement. There have been few attempts to examine decision situations in which the effects of accountability may be opposite to those produced by other incentives.

Accountability is likely to foster both accuracy goals (make good decisions) and self-presentational goals (make decisions that other people might think are good decisions or make decisions that other people might not criticize) (Schlenker, 1986; Schlenker and Weigold, 1989; Simonson, 1989; Simonson and Nye, 1992). The accountability research discussed in the previous section appears to have considered situations in which these two goals are congruent. When these two goals conflict, however, accountability may not always lead to better decisions (Simonson and Nye, 1992).

Likewise, involvement research has typically assumed that incentives that increase involvement also motivate people to make more accurate decisions. As a result, it typically has manipulated involvement via incentives that encourage accuracy and has ignored incentives that also generate affiliative or self-presentational motivations that could interfere with accuracy. Exceptions to this general rule have recently emerged, however. Some researchers now acknowledge that there are different types of involvement and that incentives that increase involvement may not always decrease decision bias (Chaiken et al., 1989; Johnson and Eagly, 1989; Kunda, 1990). Unfortunately, little effort has been made to identify situations in which incentives that increase involvement do not reduce decision bias. In the next sections, decision scenarios are described in which social or self-presentational goals generated by accountability (choose what other people think is best) may conflict with accuracy goals (choose what the decision maker believes is best).

The Influence of Heuristic Cues on Accountable Decision Makers

Accountable decision makers are likely to be highly involved and to process information thoroughly (Tetlock, 1985a). Because of their high involvement, their choices should be influenced more by product features and less by heuristic cues than the choices of decision makers who have lesser involvement (Maheswaran et al., 1992). Accountable decision makers must also be prepared to offer reasons to justify their choices. This need for justification may cause them to be influenced more by heuristic cues. For example, accountable decision makers may use heuristic cues if they believe that the cues constitute good reasons for choice. Indeed, previous research has suggested that accountable decision makers may favor choices based on reasons that are less likely to be criticized or that are easier to justify (Simonson, 1989). Simonson's results showed that accountable decision makers were more likely to choose a compromise alternative. Results also showed that such choices were more common in the case of difficult decisions and that subjects believed that the choice of a compromise alternative was less likely to be criticized.

Alba, Marmorstein, and Chattopadhyay (1992) also showed that accountable decision makers may choose alternatives based on justifiable reasons. They presented subjects with information about a product. The information was removed and, either immediately or after a delay, subjects viewed information about a second product and were asked to make a choice. When subjects made choices after a delay, accountable subjects were more likely to choose the alternative that had more features and to mention this aspect as a reason for choice. This result suggests that accountable decision makers may use a heuristic cue (more features) if they believe that the cue provides a good reason for choice.

In the present research, brand name and market share serve as heuristic cues. The research described above suggests that accountable decision makers may be more likely to choose alternatives with good brand names or high market shares if they believe that these heuristic cues serve as good reasons for choice. For example, decision makers may justify the purchase of IBM printers by saying that IBM printers are more reliable or that IBM has excellent after-sales service. Similarly, decision makers could justify the purchase of a computer printer with a high market share by asserting that high market share is a good indicator of product quality. It should be noted that the use of such heuristic cue-based justifications does not imply a minimal processing of product features; these justifications may be used even though subjects process all product information systematically. Reputable brand names and high market share may be considered good reasons for choice because they can also serve as excuses in the event that the eventual decision outcome is unfavorable (Snyder and Higgins, 1988).

Also, accountable decision makers may rely on heuristic cues to the extent that the cues predict the preferences of the audience. In a marketing or an organizational choice situation, the preference of the audiences is not always known, but may be the object of plausible speculation. In such situations, accountable decision makers may not only process information more thoroughly, but they may also search for, and rely on, heuristic cues that predict the choice of the audience. This line of reasoning suggests that, insofar as a cue can be used to infer the likely preference of an audience, the situation becomes more comparable to the case in which the audience's views are known. It follows from prior research that decision makers will defer to these views and employ the

Acceptability heuristic. Previous research has examined the effects of accountability when the views of the audience are either known or unknown. It has not examined situations in which the audience's views are unknown but where there are cues that may plausibly predict the preferences of the audience. This investigation examines a situation where the audience's preferred choice is not provided, but cues (brand names and market share) that may enable the most likely choice to be inferred are provided.

Finally, accountable decision makers may also make choices based on heuristic cues because such cues provide rationales that are easy to communicate. For example, Gordon, Rozelle, and Baxter (1988) exposed subjects to videotapes of prospective job candidates. Results showed that accountable decision makers were more influenced by the age of the job candidate when they made hiring recommendations and were able to recall less information than were nonaccountable decision makers. These authors suggest that accountable decision makers might consider less information in their decisions in order to simplify the communication of rationales. Indeed, previous research has shown that the need to communicate information leads to simpler cognitive representations (Zajonc, 1960). Thus, in contrast to most accountability research, which shows that accountability leads to greater effort and more complex processing (Tetlock, 1983a, 1983b, 1985a, 1985b; Tetlock and Kim, 1987; Simonson, 1989), accountable decision makers may consider fewer product features in choice if the need to communicate is paramount.

Taken together, there are three reasons why heuristic cues may interact with accountability to produce suboptimal decisions: (1) heuristic cues offer defensible rationales, (2) heuristic cues may predict the preferences of the audience, and (3) heuristic cues are easy to communicate. (It should be noted that these reasons are not mutually exclusive and that the present research is not designed to specifically disentangle these explanations.) Thus accountable decision makers may make worse choices than nonaccountable decision makers who are also highly involved but are not concerned about how their choices will be evaluated by other people. In the present context, accountability should lead to a greater reliance on brand names and market shares relative to other incentives that also create high involvement and motivate people to process information more thoroughly. In particular, when brand names or market shares favor one alternative, but product features favor another alternative, accountability may result in worse choices than high personal involvement. Formally, accountable decision makers are less likely than high involvement decision makers to choose the alternative with the best features if it has the least favorable brand name or the lowest market share.

In the next section, I describe an experiment that examines the influence of brand name, market share, and product features on the choices of accountable, high involvement, and low involvement decision makers.

CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 1

Overview

The chief aim of this experiment is to examine the effects of accountability and high involvement on the use of heuristic cues and on the quality of product choices. To this end, subjects were presented with information about four personal computer printers and were asked to choose the best one. After they made their choices, subjects evaluated each of the four printers and then completed a questionnaire that contained the dependent variables. Quality of choice was determined by whether subjects chose the printer with the most attractive features.

Method

Independent Variables

The independent variables were Incentive and Heuristic Cue. The three Incentive conditions were Accountability, High Involvement, and Low Involvement; the two Heuristic Cue conditions were Brand Name and Market Share. Market Share was selected as the marketing analog of the consensus information heuristic cue. Two different heuristic cues were selected for generalizability.

Accountability was manipulated by informing subjects that the marketing department of the university was planning to buy some computer printers for instructional use and wanted to measure student's opinions about these printers.

Subjects were also informed that in the near future someone from the department would call them and ask them to explain the reasons for their product opinions and choices and, in addition, that they might be invited to participate in a focus group consisting of faculty and other students to discuss these products. To heighten the Accountability manipulation, subjects were also asked to write down their names and telephone numbers so that they could be contacted (Alba, et al., 1992).

The manipulations of involvement were similar to those of Maheswaran and Chaiken (1991) and Maheswaran et al. (1992). In the High Involvement condition, subjects were informed that their product opinions and choices were very important because each of their individual responses would be communicated to the manufacturers and therefore could influence product design. In the Low Involvement condition, subjects were informed that their individual product opinions and choices were unimportant and their responses would be aggregated for any data analysis. It should be noted that subjects in the High Involvement and the Low Involvement conditions (the No Accountability conditions) were informed specifically that their product choices and opinions would be completely anonymous (Tetlock, 1985b).

The two Heuristic Cue conditions were Brand Name and Market Share. In the Brand Name condition, actual brand names were assigned to printers so that the printer with the best features had the least favorable brand name. The brand/model names were IBM PX 2390, Xerox 720-XJ, Epson DQ-570, and Star QuickPrinter 6000. (A pretest showed that Star was the least favorable brand name.) In the Market Share condition, the brand names above were replaced by fictitious names accompanied by market shares as follows: Alpha (25%), Beta (18%), Gamma (15%), and Delta (5%), respectively. Thus, the printer with the best features had the least favorable brand name (Star QuickPrinter 6000) or the lowest market share (Delta, 5%).

Product Stimuli

The descriptions of the four printers were prepared so that one printer was clearly superior. It had the highest print speed, the largest print buffer capacity, and the best graphic resolution. In addition, it was lightweight and unusually silent in operation. The printers were also described on several other attributes. Descriptions of the four printers are presented in Appendix A.

A pretest was performed to arrive at suitable brand names. Thirty subjects were presented with 8 printer brands (Star, Citizen, IBM, NEC, Okidata, Tandy, Epson, and Panasonic) and were asked to rate the quality of each on a 0 (Poor Quality) to 4 (High Quality) scale. Star had the lowest mean quality rating of all these brands ($M = 1.07$); therefore it was selected as the low quality brand for the main experiment. IBM ($M = 3.70$) and Epson ($M = 2.62$) were the two most highly rated brands in this set and were selected along with Xerox as the high quality brands for the main experiment. Analyses showed that the mean rating of Star was significantly lower than that of IBM, $F(1, 29) = 128.45$, $p < 0.0002$, and of Epson, $F(1, 29) = 32.67$, $p < 0.0002$. For the Market Share condition, market share percentages were selected by judgment.

Subjects

Two hundred and thirteen volunteer subjects enrolled in an introductory marketing course participated in this experiment in return for extra course credit. Subjects were randomly assigned to the three Incentive conditions. The two Heuristic Cue conditions were run sequentially; the Market Share condition was run subsequent to the Brand Name condition. (As will be seen later, there were no significant interactions between Heuristic Cue and Incentive on any of the dependent variables.)

Procedure

The stimulus materials were contained in a booklet. The introductory page provided subjects with information about the experimental task and contained the incentive manipulations. (The instructions in the introductory pages are presented in Appendix B.) After the introductory page, the next four pages of the booklet separately contained information about each of the four printers. These printers differed on a variety of attributes but were identically priced. Subjects were instructed to read the product information, write down their opinions about the four printers, and choose the best printer. After subjects made their choices, they were instructed to provide the reasons for their choices and to evaluate each of the four printers on 0 (Bad) to 10 (Good) scales. Subjects also indicated how much effort they devoted to the task on a 0 (Little Effort) to 10 (Considerable Effort) scale and indicated whether the feeling that other people might not agree with their choices influenced their choices on a 0 (No) to 10 (Yes) scale.

Following Simonson (1989), a minimal manipulation check for accountability was made by asking subjects whether they were told that (1) someone from the Marketing Department would call them and ask them about their product opinions and choices and (2) their product opinions and choices would be anonymous. Subjects made Yes or No responses to these two questions. For the first question, Yes responses were coded as 1 and No responses were coded as 0; for the second question, Yes responses were coded as 0 and No responses were coded as 1. The numerically coded responses to these two questions were summed, and the result was used as a measure of the extent to which subjects felt that they might be asked to account for their decisions.

As an additional check for brand reputation, subjects in the Brand Name condition also indicated the reputation of each of the brand names for quality on a 0 (Low Quality) to 10 (High Quality) scale. In addition, subjects in the Market Share condition were also asked which alternative the other participants in the experiment were most likely to choose. (Unfortunately, due to oversight, this question was not asked of subjects in the Brand Name condition.) The experiment was self-paced, but subjects generally completed the experiment in 45 minutes.

Verbal protocols were analyzed by two independent judges, one of whom had only general knowledge about the purpose of this research. Protocols were analyzed to determine the number of product attributes mentioned and to determine whether subjects mentioned a heuristic cue as a reason for product choice. The interjudge agreements were 83 percent and 98 percent, respectively. Disagreements were resolved by discussion.

Results

Manipulation Check: Accountability

Results showed that there was a significant main effect of Incentive $\underline{F}(2, 207) = 487.87$, $p < 0.0002$. A series of planned comparisons showed that subjects in the Accountability condition ($\underline{M} = 1.74$) were significantly more likely to believe that they might be asked to account for their decisions than subjects in the two No Accountability conditions ($\underline{M} = 0.10$), $\underline{F}(1, 207) = 916.52$, $p < 0.0005$. Subjects in the High Involvement condition ($\underline{M} = 0.08$) did not significantly differ on this measure from subjects in the Low Involvement condition ($M = 0.12$), $F(1, 207) = 1.61$, $p > 0.2$.

Manipulation Check: Associations Between Brand Name and Product Quality

Subjects in the Brand Name condition were asked to indicate the reputation of each of the four brand names for quality. Twelve subjects did not provide ratings for Star and were dropped from the analysis of this measure. Repeated measures analysis, with Incentive as the between-subjects factor and Brands as the repeated factor, showed that Brands differed significantly in reputation for quality, $F(3, 198) = 91.69$, $p < 0.0005$. There was no main effect of Incentive, $F(2, 66) = 2.00$, $p > 0.10$, nor was there any interaction between Incentive and Brands, $F(6, 198) = 1.29$, $p > 0.25$. Specific comparisons between Star and each of the other brands showed that the mean quality rating of Star ($M = 4.62$) was lower than the mean quality rating of IBM ($M = 9.00$), $F(1, 66) = 164.84$, $p < 0.0005$, Xerox ($M = 8.88$), $F(1, 66) = 161.38$, $p < 0.0005$, and Epson ($M = 6.23$), $F(1, 66) = 30.42$, $p < 0.005$. Thus, these results confirm that Star was the least favorable brand name.

Manipulation Check: Involvement with the Decision Task

Involvement with the decision task was measured by self-reports of the amount of effort devoted to the decision task and by the number of attributes mentioned in the verbal protocols. Results showed that there was a significant main effect of Incentive on the amount of effort devoted to the decision task, $F(2, 207) = 4.25$, $p < 0.02$, and on the number of attributes mentioned in verbal protocols, $F(2, 207) = 8.23$, $p < 0.0005$. There were no significant main effects of Heuristic Cue and no significant interactions between Incentive and Heuristic Cue on either of these measures (all Fs < 1). The means of these measures, collapsed across Heuristic Cue, are presented in Table 3-1 as a function of condition.

TABLE 3-1
Mean Ratings of Involvement Measures

Incentive	Amount of Effort	Number of Attributes
Accountability	7.74	7.80
High Involvement	7.30	5.12
Low Involvement	6.99	5.12

Planned comparisons clearly indicate that the Accountability manipulation increased involvement. Subjects in the Accountability condition reported a significantly higher level of effort ($\underline{M} = 7.74$) than subjects in the Low Involvement condition ($\underline{M} = 6.99$), $\underline{F}(1, 207) = 8.32$, $p < 0.005$. Also the mean number of attributes mentioned by subjects in the Accountability condition ($\underline{M} = 7.80$) was significantly greater than the mean number mentioned by subjects in the Low Involvement condition ($\underline{M} = 5.12$), $\underline{F}(1, 207) = 12.87$, $p < 0.0005$.

The High Involvement manipulation, however, did not appear to increase involvement. The mean amount of effort in the High Involvement condition ($\underline{M} = 7.30$) and the mean amount of effort in the Low Involvement condition ($\underline{M} = 6.99$) were not significantly different, although the means were in the expected direction, $\underline{F}(1, 207) = 1.39$, $p > 0.20$. However, the mean number of attributes mentioned by subjects in the High Involvement condition ($\underline{M} = 5.12$) was identical to the mean number mentioned by subjects in the Low Involvement condition.

These results may be due to the failure of the High Involvement manipulation to raise involvement or the failure of the Low Involvement manipulation to suppress involvement. The latter may have arisen because the stimuli conveyed evaluatively inconsistent information. For example, the brand with the poorest reputation (Star) was objectively superior on the basis of its attributes. Recent research has shown that such inconsistency can elevate the amount of processing devoted to a stimulus (Maheswaran and Chaiken, 1991; Hilton et al., 1991; Maheswaran et al., 1992). These characteristics of the stimuli may have erased the differences typically created among involvement condition by the instructions employed here.

Because pronounced differences between the two Involvement conditions did not arise, the High Involvement and the Low Involvement conditions were collapsed and treated as No Accountability conditions in subsequent analyses. Comparisons between the Accountability and the No Accountability conditions showed that accountable subjects were more involved with the decision task; they devoted more effort, $\underline{F}(1, 209) = 6.94$, $p < 0.01$, and considered more attributes, $\underline{F}(1, 209) = 17.30$, $p < 0.0005$. It was hypothesized that accountable decision makers would make worse choices than nonaccountable decision makers. Higher involvement in the Accountability condition is not fatal to this hypothesis because higher involvement typically results in better decisions (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).

Choice of the Alternative with the Best Features

A dichotomous response variable for the quality of subjects' choices was constructed. This variable was coded as 1 if subjects chose the alternative with the most favorable features and, therefore, the least favorable heuristic cue. Recall that Star was the least preferred name in the Brand Name condition and that Delta possessed the lowest market share (5%) in the Market Share condition. Both brands possessed the most favorable attributes. The results summarized in Table 3-2 are consistent with the hypothesis.

TABLE 3-2
Proportion of Subjects Choosing Best Alternative

Accountability	Heuristic Cue	
	Real Brand	Market Share
Accountability	0.24	0.33
No Accountability	0.45	0.45

Logistic regression analysis showed that accountable subjects were less likely than nonaccountable subjects to choose the alternative with the best features, Chi-Square (1, N = 213) = 4.74, $p < 0.03$. Collapsed across heuristic cue, the proportion of accountable subjects who chose the objectively best alternative (0.30) was less than the proportion of nonaccountable subjects who chose this alternative (0.45). There was no significant effect of Heuristic Cue, Chi-Square (1, N = 213) = 0.32, $p > 0.5$, nor was there a significant interaction between Accountability and Heuristic Cue, Chi-Square (1, N = 213) = 0.44, $p > 0.5$. Thus, subjects in the Accountability condition were more likely to rely on heuristic cues for their choices even though they exerted more effort and considered more attributes. In contrast, previous research has generally shown that when accountability leads to greater involvement, it typically leads to the use of more information and to better decision making (Tetlock, 1985a).

This experiment also demonstrates that incentives that increase involvement may also lead to greater reliance on heuristic cues in decision making. The prevailing wisdom is that incentives that increase involvement lead to a lesser reliance on heuristic or peripheral cues (Chaiken and Stangor, 1987; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). The present results suggest that some incentives may not only increase involvement but may also bias information processing and lead to greater reliance on heuristic cues.

Use of Heuristic Cues as Reasons for Product Choices

The open-ended verbal responses were examined to identify subjects who explicitly mentioned brand name or market share as a reason for rejecting the best alternative or selecting one of the other alternatives. The proportion of subjects in each condition who used a heuristic cue as a reason for choice is presented in Table 3-3. Results showed that the effect of accountability was not significant, Chi-Square (1, N = 213) = 0.004, $p > 0.50$. Also, there was no significant effect of Heuristic Cue, Chi-Square (1, N = 213) = 2.75, $p > 0.05$, nor was there a significant interaction between Accountability and Heuristic Cue, Chi-Square (1, N = 213) = 0.025, $p > 0.5$. Thus there is no evidence in the verbal protocol data that subjects in the Accountability conditions were more likely to believe that heuristic cues provided good reasons for choice.

TABLE 3-3
Proportion of Subjects With Explicitly Mentioned Heuristic Cue as a Reason For Choice

Accountability	Heuristic Cue	
	Brand Name	Market Share
Accountability	0.21	0.11
No Accountability	0.19	0.11

Social Influence Measure

Subjects were asked whether their choices were influenced by the feeling that other people might not agree with their decisions. The mean ratings as a function of condition are displayed in Table 3-4. The difference between the mean rating of subjects in the Accountability conditions (M = 1.24) and the mean rating of subjects in the No Accountability conditions (M = 1.19) was not statistically significant, $F < 1$. Also, there was no main effect of Heuristic Cue, nor was there any interaction between Accountability and Heuristic Cue, Fs < 1. It should be noted that the mean rating on the 0 to 10 scale was quite low (M = 1.21) which shows that subjects did not believe that they were influenced by the opinions of other people when they made their choices.

TABLE 3-4
Mean Ratings of Social Influence Measure

Accountability	Heuristic Cue	
	Brand Name	Market Share
Accountability	1.14	1.31
No Accountability	1.08	1.25

Own Choices Versus Likely Choices of Others: Market Share Condition

After subjects in the Market Share condition made their choices, they were also asked to indicate the alternative that they believed the other participants in the experiment would be most likely to choose. The proportions of subjects in the various conditions who chose Star or who predicted that others would choose Star are presented in Table 3-5.

TABLE 3-5
Proportion of Subjects Indicating Best Alternative in Market Share Conditions

Accountability	Own Choice	Others' Choice
No Accountability	0.45	0.21
Accountability	0.33	0.24

To determine whether subjects felt that heuristic cues were predictive of the choices of others, a repeated measures analysis was performed (Koch et al., 1977; Guthrie, 1981). For this analysis, Accountability was treated as the between-subjects variable and Choice (Own versus Others) was treated as the within-subject variable. Results showed that the proportion of subjects who chose the best alternative was significantly greater than the proportion of subjects who predicted that other people would choose it, Chi-Square (1, N =

132) = 12.51, $p < 0.0005$. This result shows that subjects believed that market shares are predictive of other people's choices. The interaction between Accountability and Choice was marginally significant, Chi-Square (1, N = 132) = 2.67, $p = 0.10$, which indicates that the difference between subjects' choices versus their predictions is contingent on accountability.

Further analysis showed that in the No Accountability condition, the proportion of subjects who chose the best alternative with the lowest share (0.45) was significantly greater than the proportion of subjects who expected others to choose it (0.21), Chi-Square (1, N = 87) = 14.73, $p < 0.0005$. This result is consistent with the assumption that nonaccountable people make decisions without reference to the likely choices of others. On the other hand, in the Accountability condition, the proportion of subjects who chose this alternative (0.31) was not significantly greater than the proportion who predicted that others would choose it (0.19), Chi-Square (1, N = 45) = 1.66, $p > 0.15$. This result is consistent with theory that suggests that accountable decision makers are likely to opt for the alternative that they expect their audience to choose (Tetlock, 1985a). Neither the accountable nor the nonaccountable subjects expected others to choose the best alternative (0.21 vs 0.19). The difference in the proportions of subjects who actually chose Star indicates that accountable subjects may have made worse choices because they were more socially compliant.

Although subjects may have used market share as a signal of the preferences of the audience, they may have also assumed that the decisions made by other subjects would be less analytic and therefore more influenced by heuristic cues. Indeed, research has shown that individuals are not always unbiased self evaluators, but, instead, may seek many goals through social comparison (Wood, 1989). Thus, such a biased view of the decision-making processes of others may have arisen because subjects wanted to present themselves as better decision makers than their peers (Schlenker, 1980). If people believe that they are better decision makers than the typical other person, then one would also expect subjects to believe that other people are more influenced by brand names and public opinion.

Conclusions

Contrary to the predictions of previous research, accountability led to enhanced reliance on heuristic cues. Data gathered from subjects in the Market Share conditions showed that only nonaccountable decision makers predicted that other people would be less likely than themselves to choose the alternative with the lowest market share and the best features. This result suggests that accountable decision makers may have made worse choices because they were reluctant to choose an alternative that they thought others were unlikely to choose.

Unfortunately, comparable data were not gathered from subjects in the Brand Name condition. This oversight is corrected in Experiment 2. In addition, Experiment 2 incorporates a No Heuristic Cue condition. In a No Heuristic Cue condition, the probability that subjects choose the best brand should not exceed the probability that they expect other subjects to choose it. In the absence of heuristic cues, subjects should rely on product features for their own choices as well as for their predictions about the choices that others are likely to make. Thus, the inclusion of the No Heuristic Cue conditions in the second experiment should confirm that subjects' expectations of other people's choices are influenced by heuristic cues.

In addition, subjects in Experiment 2 were informed that four marketing professors were provided with information about the four printers and each one chose a different alternative. Thus, subjects in the accountability conditions knew that the members of their audience (marketing faculty) had conflicting opinions about the printers. The rationale for this manipulation of accountability is discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT 2

Overview

As noted at the outset, when the preference of the audience is known and unambiguous, accountable decision makers may merely acquiesce to it. Thus, Experiment 1 examined a more interesting case in which the views of the audience are unknown. Experiment 2 examines a case in which the audience's views are known but are ambiguous, i.e., members of the audience have conflicting views. Often, decision makers are accountable to several individuals who may have conflicting views. It has been suggested that, in such cases, decision makers work more diligently to identify the best choice because they expect the decision to be contentious (Schlenker and Weigold, 1989). This implies that when audience members prefer different alternatives, accountable decision makers should be more concerned about identifying the best alternative and less concerned about what other people think is best. If this is the case, conflicting preferences may lead to less reliance on heuristic cues in choice.

On the other hand, it is also possible that awareness of conflicting audience preferences may have the opposite effect. For example, conflicting preferences may be perceived as a signal that the alternatives are almost equally attractive. Consequently, decision makers may feel that it is futile to exert much effort. Thus, the effect of conflicting audience preferences on decision quality is unclear.

As in the previous experiment, subjects were presented with information about four PC printers and were asked to choose the best one. The major departure was that all subjects were informed that four marketing faculty were shown the same information, and each one chose a different alternative.

Method

Independent Variables

The two independent variables were Accountability and Brand Familiarity. The manipulation of Accountability and No Accountability were identical to the previous manipulations of Accountability and High Involvement, i.e., subjects in the Accountability conditions were informed that they might be accountable to other marketing students and faculty.

Brand Familiarity was manipulated by the use of real versus fictitious brand names. As in Experiment 1, the real brands were IBM PX 2390, Xerox 720-XJ, Epson DQ-570, and Star QuickPrinter 6000; they were replaced by the fictitious names of Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and Delta, respectively, in the Fictitious condition. Also, as in Experiment 1, the printer with the best features was Star QuickPrinter 6000 (or Delta).

Subjects

One hundred and thirty three volunteer subjects enrolled in an introductory marketing course participated in this experiment in return for extra course credit. Assignment of subjects to conditions was random. One subject did not complete the choice task and was excluded from analyses.

Materials and Procedure

The stimulus materials were contained in a booklet. The introductory page provided subjects with information about the experimental task and about the opinions of the marketing professors. It also contained the Accountability manipulations. The instructions in the introductory pages are presented in Appendix C.

After the introductory page, the next several pages of the booklet contained information about the four printers. (The descriptions of the printers were identical to those in the first experiment.) Subjects were instructed to read the product information, to write down their opinions about the four printers, and to choose the best one. After subjects made their choices, they were instructed to provide the reasons for their choices and to evaluate each of the four printers on a 0 (Bad) to 10 (Good) scale. Subjects also indicated their level of effort on a 0 (Little Effort) to 10 (Considerable Effort) scale and indicated the extent to which the opinions of the marketing professors influenced their choices on a 0 (Little Influence) to 10 (Considerable Influence) scale. The manipulation check for accountability was the same as in the first experiment (Simonson, 1989). Subjects in the Real Brand conditions also indicated the extent to which their choices were influenced by brand names on a 0 (Little Influence) to 10 (Considerable Influence) scale.

In addition, subjects were asked their opinions about how other participants may have performed this choice task. Subjects were asked which alternative the other participants in the experiment were most likely to choose. Also, they indicated the extent to which the opinions of the marketing professors may have influenced the choices of other participants in the experiment on a 0 (Little Influence) to 10 (Considerable Influence) scale. Subjects in the Real

Brand conditions also indicated the extent to which the choices of others were influenced by brand names on a 0 (Little Influence) to 10 (Considerable Influence) scale. The experiment was self-paced, but subjects generally completed the experiment in 45 minutes.

Verbal protocols were analyzed by the same two independent judges, one of whom had only general knowledge about the purpose of this research. Protocols were analyzed to determine the number of product attributes mentioned and to determine whether subjects in the familiar brand name conditions mentioned a brand name as a reason for product choice. The interjudge agreements were 81 percent and 97 percent, respectively. Disagreements were resolved by discussion.

Results

Manipulation Checks

The manipulation check for accountability showed that subjects in the Accountability condition ($M = 1.73$) were significantly more likely to believe that they might be asked to account for their decisions than subjects in the No Accountability condition ($M = 0.03$), $F(1, 128) = 889.17$, $p = 0.0001$. Thus, this measure shows that subjects were aware of the Accountability manipulation.

As in the previous experiment, involvement with the decision task was measured by self-reports of the amount of effort devoted to the decision task and by the number of attributes mentioned in the verbal protocols. Results obtained were different from Experiment 1; there was no significant main effect of accountability on the amount of effort devoted to the decision task, $F(1,128) = 0.30$, $p > 0.5$, or on the number of attributes mentioned in verbal protocols, $F(1, 128) = 0.02$, $p > 0.50$. There were also no significant main effects of Brand

Familiarity and no significant interactions between Accountability and Brand Familiarity on either of these measures (all p values > 0.10). Means, collapsed across Brand Familiarity, are presented in Table 4-1 as a function of condition.

TABLE 4-1
Mean Ratings of Involvement Measures

Accountability	Amount of Effort	Number of Attributes
Accountability	7.49	4.90
No Accountability	7.31	5.00

These results suggest that in Experiment 2, unlike in Experiment 1, subjects in the Accountability and in the No Accountability conditions had approximately equal involvement with the decision task. Accountable subjects did not devote more effort to the decision task, nor did they consider more attributes when they made their decisions.

Choice of the Alternative with the Best Features

The proportions of subjects in the various conditions who chose the best alternative are presented in Table 4-2.

TABLE 4-2
Proportion of Subjects Choosing Best Alternative

Accountability	Brand Familiarity	
	Real Brands	Fictitious Brands
Accountability	0.31	0.55
No Accountability	0.46	0.68

Logistic regression was performed on the dichotomous response variable (i.e., choice of the alternative with the best features). Choice of either Star or Delta was assigned a score of 1; all other choices were assigned a 0. The explanatory variables were Accountability, Brand Familiarity, and the interaction between Accountability and Brand Familiarity. Results showed that there was a significant effect of Brand Familiarity, Chi-Square (1, N = 131) = 6.68, $p < 0.01$. The proportion of subjects who chose the best alternative in the Real Brands condition (0.40) was lower than the proportion of subjects who chose it in the Fictitious Brands condition (0.62). Thus, in the absence of real brand names, the majority of subjects were able to identify the alternative with the best features. This suggests that subjects had the ability to process product information systematically.

Also, as predicted, the proportion of subjects who chose the best alternative in the Accountability conditions (0.43) was less than the proportion of subjects who chose it in the No Accountability conditions (0.56), although the difference did not attain traditional levels of significance, Chi-Square (1, N = 131) = 2.55, $p = 0.11$. The interaction between Accountability and Brand Familiarity, however, was nonsignificant, Chi-Square (1, N = 131) = 0.02, $p > 0.50$.

Because neither Accountability nor Brand Familiarity influenced the amount of effort that subjects devoted to the decision task, an additional regression analysis was performed with effort added to the preceding regression model as an explanatory variable. The use of effort as an additional explanatory variable was based on the assumption that subjects who exert more effort may also be more likely to choose the alternative with the best features. This additional analysis was not performed with the choice data from Experiment 1 because accountable decision makers in Experiment 1 devoted more effort to the decision task.

Results showed that increased effort significantly increased the likelihood that decision makers would choose the best alternative, Chi-Square (1, N = 131) = 4.90, $p < 0.03$. With effort as an explanatory variable, the effect of accountability on the choice of the best alternative became marginally significant, Chi-Square (1, N = 131) = 3.21, $p < 0.075$. The effect of Brand Familiarity remained significant, Chi-Square (1, N = 131) = 7.99, $p < 0.005$, and the interaction between Accountability and Brand Familiarity remained nonsignificant, Chi-Square (1, N = 131) = 0.04, $p > 0.50$.

Merely for purposes of comparison, the proportion of subjects who chose the best alternative in the Real Brand Name conditions in Experiments One and Two are displayed in Table 4-3 as a function of Accountability. Analysis of the choice data showed that there was a significant main effect of Accountability, Chi-Square (1, N = 152) = 4.65, $p < 0.04$, but no significant main effect of Experiment, Chi-Square (1, N = 152) = 0.37, $p > 0.50$, or significant interaction between Experiment and Accountability, Chi-Square (1, N = 152) = 0.15, $p > 0.50$. While acknowledging that such a comparison across experiments may be contaminated due to nonrandom assignment of subjects to experiments, the result suggests that the effect of Accountability on choice was not affected by differences in how the audience's views were portrayed.

TABLE 4-3
Proportion of Subjects Choosing Best Alternative in Real Brand Conditions

Accountability	Experiment	
	One	Two
Accountability	0.24	0.31
No Accountability	0.45	0.46

Own Choices Versus Predicted Choices of Others

As in Experiment 1, subjects were asked to predict the alternative that they believed the other participants in the experiment would be most likely to choose. The proportions of each as a function of condition are reported in Table 4-4. As before, a repeated measures analysis was performed that contrasted own choice of the best alternative versus prediction that others would choose the best alternative. For this analysis, Accountability and Brand Familiarity were treated as the between-subjects variables and Choice (Own versus Others) was treated as the within-subject variable. Results showed that there were significant main effects of Brand Familiarity, Chi-Square (1, N = 132) = 20.53, $p < 0.0001$ and Choice, Chi-Square (1, N = 132) = 13.85, $p < 0.0005$. In addition, the interaction between Brand Familiarity and Label was marginally significant, Chi-Square (1, N = 132) = 3.25, $p < 0.07$.

TABLE 4-4
Proportion of Subjects Indicating Best Alternative

Brand Familiarity	Accountability	Choice	
		Own	Others
Real Brands	No Accountability	0.46	0.10
	Accountability	0.31	0.19
Fictitious Brands	No Accountability	0.68	0.61
	Accountability	0.55	0.45

Separate analyses were performed in each of the two Brand Familiarity conditions. Results showed that in the Real Brand condition, the proportion of subjects who chose the best alternative was significantly greater than the proportion of subjects who predicted that other people would choose it, Chi-Square (1, N = 71) = 16.11, $p < 0.0005$. This result is similar to the result obtained in Experiment 1 and shows that subjects believe that brand names are predictive of other people's choices.

It should be recalled that in this experiment, subjects were also informed that four marketing professors examined information about the four printers and each chose a different one. Because subjects knew that there was heterogeneity of preference, it was hypothesized that accountable subjects might not consider the likely choices of others when they made their own choices. The results do not support this proposition; a significant interaction emerged between Accountability and Choice, Chi-Square (1, N = 71) = 3.77, $p = 0.05$. Follow-up tests showed that in the No Accountability Real Brand condition, the proportion of subjects who chose the best alternative was significantly greater than the proportion of subjects who expected others to choose it, Chi-Square (1, N = 39) = 17.86, $p < 0.0001$. This result is consistent with the assumption that nonaccountable people make decisions without reference to the likely choices of others. On the other hand, in the Accountability Real Brand condition, the proportion of subjects who chose the best alternative (0.31) was not significantly greater than the proportion who predicted that others would choose it (0.19), Chi-Square (1, N = 32) = 2.13, $p > 0.14$. This result is consistent with the result obtained in the Market Share condition of Experiment 1 and with theory which suggests that accountable decision makers are likely to opt for alternatives that they perceive to be broadly popular (Tetlock, 1985a).

A different pattern of results was obtained in the Fictitious Brands condition. The proportion of subjects who chose the best alternative (0.62) was not significantly greater than the proportion predicted to choose the best alternative ($p = 0.53$), Chi-Square (1, N = 60) = 1.75, $p > 0.15$. This result shows that when brand names were absent, subjects projected their own choices onto others. Further support for the differential influence of brand names on choices versus predictions is obtained by a comparison of results across the two No Accountability conditions. For this analysis Brand Familiarity was the between-subjects variable and Choice was the within-subject variable Results showed that there was a significant interaction between Brand Familiarity and Choice, Chi-Square (1, N = 68) = 5.63, $p < 0.02$. The difference between the choice proportions in the Fictitious Brands and the Real Brands conditions (0.68 vs 0.46) was much less than the difference between the prediction proportions in the Fictitious Brands and the Real Brand conditions (0.61 vs 0.10). This indicates that the influence of heuristic cues on predictions was greater than the influence on choices.

Brand Names as Reasons for Product Choices

The open-ended verbal protocols of subjects in the Brand Name conditions were examined to determine whether subjects explicitly mentioned brand name as a reason for rejecting Star and/or choosing one of the other three alternatives (see Table 4-5). The proportion of subjects in the Accountability condition who explicitly mentioned brand names as reasons for product choices was not significantly different from the proportion of subjects in the No Accountability condition who explicitly mentioned brand names as reasons for product choices, Chi-Square (1, N = 71) = 0.52, p > 0.40.

TABLE 4-5
Proportion of Subjects With Explicitly Mentioned Brand Name as a Reason For Choice

Accountability	Real Brands
Accountability	0.25
No Accountability	0.18

Influence of Brand Names on Choices

Influence on own choices. Subjects in the Brand Name conditions were also asked about the influence of brand name on printer choice. Ratings of brand influence on the 10-point scale are presented in Table 4-6. Analysis revealed no effect of Accountability (F < 1). This measure, too, does not provide evidence that accountable subjects believed that brand names were more important for product choices.

TABLE 4-6
Mean Ratings of Influence of Brand Names on Choices in Real Brand Conditions

Accountability	Own Choices	Others Choices
No Accountability	4.95	7.33
Accountability	4.66	6.91

Influence on own versus others' choices. To further examine whether subjects thought that they were superior to others as decision makers (i.e., less influenced by heuristic cues), subjects in the Real Brands condition were also asked about the likely effect of brand names on the printer choices of other participants in the experiment (see Table 4-6). Repeated measures analyses were performed on the ratings of influence of brand names on subjects' own choices and on the ratings of expected influence of brand names on others' choices. Results showed that the mean rating of the influence of brand names on subjects' own choices ($M = 4.82$) was significantly less than the mean rating of the expected influence of brand names on the choices of other participants in the experiment, ($M = 7.14$), F (1, 69) = 39.04, $p < 0.0005$. The interaction of this factor with Accountability was not significant ($F < 1$). This result indicates that decision makers, irrespective of Accountability condition, felt that other decision makers would be less analytic and would rely more on brand names for their choices.

Marketing Professors' Influence On Choice

Influence on own choice. To obtain a measure of audience influence, subjects were asked whether the opinions of the marketing professors influenced their choice. Ratings were uniformly low in all conditions. The mean ratings on the 10-point scale are presented in Table 4-7. Results showed that there were no significant main effects or interactions (Fs < 1). Thus, accountable subjects did not report that they were more influenced by the opinions of the marketing faculty. Similar results were obtained in Experiment 1 where subjects were asked whether their choices were influenced by the feeling that other people might disagree with their choices. In that experiment, accountable subjects did not report that they were influenced more by the opinions of others.

TABLE 4-7
Mean Ratings of Marketing Professors Influence

Brand Familiarity	Accountability	On Self	On Others
Real Brands	No Accountability	1.56	3.32
	Accountability	1.21	3.22
Fictitious Brands	No Accountability	1.16	2.52
	Accountability	1.62	3.52

Influence on own versus others' choices. To further examine whether subjects in general thought that they were better decision makers than other people (less influenced by public opinion), subjects were also asked whether they thought that the opinions of the marketing professors had little influence or considerable influence on the printer choices of other participants in the experiment. (The data are reported in Table 4-7). Repeated measures analyses were performed on the ratings of the influence of the marketing professors on subjects' own choices and on the ratings of the expected influence of marketing professors on others' choices. Results showed that the mean rating of the influence of the marketing professors on subjects' own choices ($M = 1.40$) was less than the mean rating of the influence of marketing professors on the choices of other participants in the experiment ($M = 3.12$); this difference was statistically significant, $F\ (1, 127) = 61.96$, $p < 0.0005$. All other main effects and interactions were nonsignificant (Fs < 1.75). Overall, these results indicate that decision makers, irrespective of Accountability condition, believed that they were better decision makers (less influenced by the opinions of the marketing professors) than were other people. These results may have arisen because subjects wanted to indicate to the experimenter that they were better decision makers than the average subject.

Conclusions

The results of this experiment show that the effects of Accountability on product choice in the Real Brand condition in Experiment 2 were similar to those in the Real Brand condition in Experiment 1; accountable decision makers were less likely to choose the alternative with the unfamiliar brand name and the best features. This result suggests that the effects of Accountability when members of the audience have conflicting views may not be different from those when the views of the audience members are unknown.

Subjects in this experiment indicated that other people were less likely to choose an unesteemed brand with good features. This suggests that brand names are predictive of the choices of other people. Also, when brand names were present, accountable decision makers were more likely than nonaccountable decision makers to choose the printer that they expected others to choose. Similar results were obtained in the Market Share condition of Experiment 1. Taken together, these results provide evidence that accountable decision makers will rely on heuristic cues for their choices if they believe that their audience will rely on these cues.

In addition, this experiment provides evidence that subjects portray themselves as better decision makers than others. Subjects reported that they were less influenced than others by brand names and by the opinions of marketing professors. Finally, this experiment demonstrated that when brand names were absent, subjects projected their own choice onto others. In contrast, when brand names were present, subjects also relied on brand names for their predictions.

CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

General Discussion

Accountability is prevalent in social and organizational situations and is likely to have a pervasive influence on organizational and household buying decisions (Schlenker, 1980, 1982; Tetlock, 1985a). The results of these experiments clearly indicate that it is necessary for marketing researchers to study accountability in decision situations in which there are unique marketing cues because the results obtained by social psychologists will not always generalize to such situations. For example, marketing decision contexts generally contain heuristic cues such as brand names or market shares that may be indicative of the preferences of other people. In such cases, accountable decision makers may devote more effort to the decision task, but may ultimately make suboptimal decisions on the basis of these heuristic cues. These results are in contrast to previous work which has generally found that accountability leads to deeper processing, greater use of information, and better decision making (Tetlock, 1985a; Sanbonmatsu and Fazio, 1990).

The present results also appear to contradict the results of Kruglanski and Freund (1983) who showed that accountable decision makers were less influenced by ethnic identity when they made judgments of essay quality. One plausible explanation for the different results is that subjects may have had different expectations about their respective audiences. In the experiments described in this dissertation, accountable decision makers expected their audience to rely more on brand names and market share when they evaluated the products; thus, these decision makers did not choose alternatives with a poor brand name or a low market share. Kruglanski and Freund (1983) did not report any evidence about audience expectations. It is possible that their subjects expected their audience, which consisted of students at a Teachers seminary, to be unbiased by ethnic identity because their audience would compare their evaluations to those made by experienced teachers. The different results obtained by Kruglanski and Freund (1983) and by the experiments described above underscore an important point, that is, the extent to which accountable decision makers rely on heuristic cues is likely to depend upon the extent to which they believe that their audience is likely to favor decisions that are based on these cues.

Although the results of the present experiments were obtained with college undergraduates, it is likely that accountable organizational buyers are also influenced by heuristic cues and make poorer choices. The extent to which buyers are influenced by heuristic cues is likely to depend upon their beliefs about their audience's propensity to process information analytically. One should note that, in the experiments described here, subjects predicted that the choices of other decision makers would be more influenced by heuristic cues even though these other decision makers saw the same information, had the same amount of time to process this information and, on average, had the same level of expertise. Often, organizational buyers may have access to more information, may have more time to process this information, and may also have greater relevant expertise than their audience. Thus, they may have even more reason to believe that their audience might be nonanalytic and rely on heuristic cues. Therefore, accountability may often lead to worse choices in organizational settings.

The effects of accountability in the experiments described above are also different from those observed by Gordon et al. (1988). In their experiment, accountable subjects considered less information when they evaluated job candidates. In Experiment 1, on the other hand, accountable subjects considered more information for their product choices. Yet, both studies showed that accountable decision makers were more likely to rely on their stereotypes (priors) about the alternatives when they made decisions Thus, the present results show that accountable decision makers may rely on stereotypes or priors, even when they consider more information and are more involved with the decision task.

Previous research on the effects of involvement has generally shown that when people are more involved with a decision task they rely less on heuristic cues (Chaiken and Stangor, 1987; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). The results in Experiment 1 demonstrate that greater use of heuristic cues is not a necessary consequence of lesser decision involvement; accountable decision makers were more involved with the decision task and devoted more effort and considered more attributes, yet, their choices were influenced more by brand names and market shares. These results provide evidence that there are different types of involvement that have different effects on decision making (Chaiken et al., 1989).

The results also show that accountable decision makers are more likely to rely on the Acceptability heuristic (Tetlock, 1985a) and choose the alternative that they thought other people would choose. Tetlock (1985a) has suggested that accountable decision makers use the Acceptability heuristic because they want to minimize effort. In Experiment 1, however, accountable decision makers used the Acceptability heuristic even though they devoted more effort to the decision task. Previous research (Tetlock, 1985a) has demonstrated that accountable subjects use the Acceptability heuristic when they are informed about the views of the audience. These experiments demonstrate that accountable decision makers may use the Acceptability heuristic even when the views of the audience are unknown (but may be predicted) or are ambiguous.

The results from the verbal protocols show that accountable decision makers were not more likely to indicate heuristic cue-based reasons for their choices. Nonetheless, analyses of the actual choices that subjects made clearly shows that accountable decision makers relied more on heuristic cues for their choices. Also, accountable decision makers did not report that their choices were influenced more by the opinions of other people. However, analyses of subjects' choices and the choices they expected other people to make show clearly that accountable decision makers were much more likely to choose alternatives that they expected other people to choose. A plausible explanation for these conflicting results obtained from choice and self-report data is that accountable subjects were specifically asked to choose the best alternative. Therefore, they may have been reluctant to admit that they relied on heuristic cues or that they were influenced by the opinions of others because they wanted to project an image of themselves as good decision makers who chose on the basis of product features. Another explanation is that accountable decision makers were unaware of factors that influenced their decisions (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977). This explanation is less tenable, because previous research has shown that accountable decision makers are generally more aware of the information they use in their decisions (Cvetkovich, 1978).

These experiments show that subjects were biased in their predictions about other subjects; they believed that the choices of others were more influenced by heuristic cues than their own choices. Also, subjects reported that they were less influenced by brand names and less influenced by the opinions of the marketing professors than were other subjects. There may well be a motivational basis for such biased social comparisons (Wood, 1989). For example, people have a need to enhance their identities (Schlenker, 1980, 1986) and may do so by believing that they are better decision makers than other people. Further research is needed to determine the extent to which decision makers in other settings believe that they are better decision makers than others.

Finally, the present results conform to a small minority of prior studies showing that accountability does not necessarily lead to better decision outcomes. In those studies, accountability was shown to motivate subjects to process all stimulus information, including information that was irrelevant to the decision (Tetlock and Boettger, 1989; c.f. Wilson and Schooler, 1991). It is unlikely, however, that accountability led to worse choices in this dissertation solely because it lead people to think more deeply and integrate irrelevant information. If this were the sole explanation, then one would not expect that accountability would lead to greater social compliance. Also, accountable subjects also appeared to make worse choices in Experiment 2, even though accountability did not lead to greater decision involvement. Thus, it appears that accountability can exert a variety of influences on decision making and decision quality.

Implications

The results of these experiments have some implications for the diffusion of new products. These results suggest that accountable decision makers, such as organizational buyers, are more likely to buy an inferior product with a good brand name than a superior product with an unknown brand name. For this reason, a superior new product with is more likely to be purchased by nonaccountable decision makers because its brand awareness and market share are likely to be low. As a result, there may be greater barriers to entry for products with unknown brand names in markets in which a greater proportion of buyers are accountable for their choices.

The results of these experiments also have some implications for market researchers. For example, people who are members of a focus group are likely to be concerned about the impressions they make on others. Therefore, in such cases, they may speak more favorably about alternatives that have a good brand name or a high market share. Thus, the opinions of people elicited during their participation in a focus group may differ systematically from their opinions elicited by an anonymous survey.

Future Research

Future research needs to be conducted to identify factors that influence the extent to which accountable decision makers rely on heuristic cues in choice. The extent to which accountable decision makers are influenced by heuristic cues is likely to depend upon their beliefs about their audience's propensity to process information analytically and upon the prescriptions that they feel will be used to judge the quality of their decisions (Schlenker, 1980, 1982). These issues have received little attention in the literature.

APPENDIX A
PRODUCT STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 1

IBM PX 2390

The IBM PX 2390 closes the gap on laser performance. It can print letters and labels with scarcely a pause. Envelopes, forms and receipts with equal ease. A printer with a paper path that is virtually straight for exceptional reliability.

The versatility to do more. The IBM PX 2390 moves from one job to another without a hitch. To begin with, it has four paper paths - all virtually straight. ONE and TWO: Push or pull continuous forms through a front slot. THREE: Feed cut sheets and envelopes through a second front slot. FOUR: Pull forms through from the bottom. PLUS, a fifth path lets you stack continuous-form paper in the rear to feed into the front. That's versatility. There's more. "Rip and run" (also known as "document on demand") means you can tear off a page of printed data without wasting a sheet of continuous-forms paper - and the printer positions the paper at the top of the next form.

Ease of use to enhance productivity. Start with a switchless setup that gets you working fast. Then, the control panel is so easy to use you don't need a manual to figure it out. Select fonts and pitches with single-touch buttons; if you wish, you can protect the one's you're using with the font/pitch lock. Keep other users from changing the font, pitch and format you want with the panel disable mode.

If you think all that's easy, check out the ribbon. It simply snaps in and out - the ink never touches your fingers.

It's even easy to load the paper. The auto load assist senses the cut sheet and automatically pulls it through to the first writing line. And to move back and forth between forms and cut sheets of regular paper. Just park the paper and flip a switch.

Compatibility to fit every environment. The IBM PX 2390 teams up perfectly with any IBM PC or PS/2 system - or any other IBM-compatible computer.

Good looks, fast moves, nice price. The IBM 2390 has it all

Eight fonts: six letter-quality typefaces - and seven pitches.

High speeds: FastDraft (200 cps at 10 cpi), Draft (180 cps at 10 cpi), and Letter Quality (90 cps at 10 cpi).

Auto Sheet Feed: so you can use regular sheets of letter quality paper.

Resolution: Letter quality, all-points addressable (APA) graphics resolution of 360 x 360 dpi

Paper handling: Friction feed; movable push-pull tractors; bottom/front paper feed; four-part forms; cut sheets and continuous forms; paper parking; document on demand; labels and envelopes; Auto Sheet Feed.

Print buffer: 16 K standard

The IBM PX 2390 stands out with unbeatable performance and value at an extremely competitive price.

STAR QuickPrinter 6000

If you are big on ideas but low on budget, it's time to meet the Star QuickPrinter 6000. It's a printer that puts out laser-like output at very reasonable prices. It fits neatly on your desktop and whispers while you work. Care and feeding are remarkably easy. Take a close look at what we have to offer.

Beautiful print quality at a beautiful price. Exceptionally sharp edged, eye-popping graphics, smooth lines, scalable fonts: the sophistication of a high-end printer at the price of a low end.

Outstanding graphics. The best graphics resolution of any printer in it's class - all-points addressable (APA) graphics of 420 x 420 dots per inch.

New improved ink for touch-safe permanence. New water resistant ink guarantees that your beautiful output won't run or smear. So your work keeps looking good long after the first glance.

It satisfies your need for speed. The Star QuickPrinter 6000 provides rapid-fire output.

Draft mode: Upto 240 characters per second (10 cpi).

Letter Quality mode: Upto 120 characters per second (10 cpi).

You Can Hear Yourself Think. What you don't need is a printer that you have to yell over. The Star QuickPrinter 6000 is very quiet, so you can work while it works for you.

It's Mistake Proof. Easy-load paper. Snap-in ink cartridges so there are no messy fingers. Slide-out font cartridges. Push-button operation. A snap to use. The front panel controls virtually explain themselves. So you don't feel like you are attempting to fly a jet-aircraft when you are printing a simple memo.

Portable and Lightweight The Star QuickPrinter 6000 is so lightweight - 4 lbs. without sheet feeder and 7 lbs. with sheet feeder - you can carry it anywhere with you. Convenient handle for easy carrying. The automatic sheet feeder can quickly be attached or detached, if required.

Specifications

Print speed. Letter-quality mode: 120 cps at 10 cpi.

Draft mode: 240 cps at 10 cpi.

Typefaces (Internal to Printer). Courier, Courier Italic, CG Times, CG Times Italic, Letter Gothic, Letter Gothic Italic. Other print features: bold, expanded, underline, double underline, super-subscript.

Paper. Size: US Letter (8.5 x 11 inches), US legal (8.5 x 14 inches), A4 (210 x 297 mm), #10 envelope (4.124 x 9.5 inches).

Paper handling. Built-in sheet or transparency feeder (up to 100 sheets) and Manual envelope feed.

Buffer Size. 32 Kilobytes.

EPSON DQ-570

The Epson DQ-570 is an IBM-compatible letter-quality printer. It offers business and home users fast print speeds, versatile paper handling and an impressive list of intelligently designed features. Quick, affordable, and easy to use, it delivers clear, sharp output excellent for whatever your job requires. Incorporating scalable fonts and enhanced graphic capabilities, the Epson DQ-570 offers more performance and value than any printer in it's class.

Features and Benefits

Exclusive DSX printer language. Ensures compatibility with the industry standard while adding scalable fonts and enhanced graphics.

Fonts. Twelve built-in fonts including two scalable fonts. Wide choice of type styles for professional looking documents.

Versatile paper handling. Top, bottom, front, and rear paper paths for easy handling of continuous forms and single sheets or envelopes.

Auto sheet loading. Provides easy loading of single sheets and continuous forms or envelopes.

Specifications

Print speed. High Speed Draft: 225 cps (10 cpi), Draft: 210 cps (10 cpi), Letter Quality: 90 cps (10 cpi)

Scalable fonts Roman 8 to 32 points, Sans Serif 8 to 32 points

Resident bit-mapped fonts (cpi)

Draft (10, 12, 15), Roman (10, 12, 15, proportional),

Sans Serif (10, 12, 15, proportional), Courier(10, 12, 15), Prestige (10, 12), Script (10, 12), Orator (10)

Print enhancements. Bit-mapped fonts:- Double-wide, double-high, condensed, double strike. Also, bit-mapped and scalable fonts:- Superscript, subscript, emphasized underline, score, outline, shadow, italic, strike-through, double underline

Graphics. Maximum Graphics Resolution: 360 x 360 dpi

Paper handling. Single sheets: Top Loading - 5.8" to 10.1", Front Loading 7.2" to 10.1", Cut sheet feeder - 8.5". Continuous: 4.0" to 10.0".No 6 envelopes: 6.5" x 3.625", No. 10 envelopes: 9.5" x 4.125" Labels: 2.5" x 5.9". Forms: Continuous, multi-part, original plus three carbonless copies; maximum thickness 0.012 inches.

Input buffer. 24 Kilobytes

Hardware features. Control panel selection of: fonts, condensed, paper source, micro-adjustment; paper feeding; buffer clear; tear-off, pause, main power.

XEROX 720-XJ

Your new professional images come from a printer that provides crisp, laser-quality printing and takes up less than half the space of a laser printer. It's the Xerox 720-XJ -a high-quality, economical printer that hones your text and graphics to a fine 360 x 360 dots-per-inch resolution. Combined with it's compact size and range of built-in type styles the Xerox 720-XJ becomes the printer of choice if you want to work without sacrificing quality ... and without breaking the budget. With its small footprint the Xerox 720-XJ takes up little of your precious desk space. Most important it makes your work look terrific. Besides high resolution, the 720-XJ has eight different fonts. Choose the font that suits your document, or combine two or more fonts to add visual interest and impact.

Delivers laser-quality text and graphics. Even complex graphics come out looking crisp and clean. You get the look of laser, which is what most of us expect to see in documents these days.

Small and lightweight for easy portability. The Xerox 720-XJ is so light-weight -4 lbs. without sheet feeder and 7 lbs. with sheet feeder- you can can easily carry it around. But the biggest benefit to its small size is how easily it sits on a crowded desktop. You can even stash it out of sight in a drawer or on a shelf when you are not using it.

User friendly. The Xerox 720-XJ is easy to set up- the automatic sheet feeder latches in place. An easy to use six-button control panel makes printing simple.

Printer Specifications

Speed. Draft Mode: 120 cps at 10 cpi. Letter Quality Mode: 90 cps at 10 cpi.

Print quality. 360 x 360 dpi.

Font selection. Draft, Courier, Prestige, Roman, Script, Orator, Orator-S, Sans Serif.

Type attributes. Double High, Double Wide, Double Strike, Condensed, Superscript, Subscript, Reverse, Shadow, Outline, Expanded, Emphasized, Overscore, Underscore, Strike Through

Paper handling. 50-sheet automatic sheet feeder, manual cut sheets, envelopes, transparencies

User features. User-friendly 6-button LED control panel, easily portable, small size for crowded desktops.

Print buffer. 16 Kilobytes

APPENDIX B
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 1

Instructions: High Involvement Brand Name Condition

We would like your personal opinions about four computer printers that are about to be introduced on the market. Your individual opinions are very important because your responses will let the manufacturers know if they have to improve their products before they are introduced. On the next few pages, you will see some information about these four printers, the Epson DQ-570, the IBM PX 2390, the Star QuickPrinter 6000, and the Xerox 720-XJ. (Note that all these printers have the same list price, $349.99). We would like to know which printer you think is likely to be the best printer. Now you may turn the page and start reading the information about these products. After you have read all the information, you may write down what you think of these computers and choose which printer you think is likely to be the best choice. After you have chosen, you may complete the rest of the experiment. We want your responses to be completely anonymous. Please do not write your name or any form of identification on the questionnaire. Thank you for your assistance.

Instructions: Low Involvement Brand Name Condition

We would like your personal opinions about four computer printers that are about to be introduced on the market. Your individual opinions are not important, and they will be averaged with many other survey respondents for any data analysis. On the next five pages of this booklet, you will see some information about these four printers, the Epson DQ-570, the IBM PX 2390, the Star QuickPrinter 6000, and the Xerox 720-XJ. (Note that all these printers have the same list price, $349.99). We would like to know which printer you think is best. Now you may turn the page and start reading the information about these products. After you have read the information, you may write down what you think of these computers and choose which printer is likely to be the best choice. After you have chosen, you may complete the rest of the experiment.

We want your responses to be completely anonymous. Please do not write your name or any form of identification on the questionnaire. Thank you for your assistance.

Instructions: Accountability Brand Name Condition

The Marketing Department is planning to buy several personal computers and computer printers for instructional use. We would like to see if student's choices are the same or are different from those of the marketing professors. In this booklet, you have been given some information about four IBM-compatible printers, that are being considered by the Department. These are the Epson DQ-570, the IBM PX 2390, the Star QuickPrinter 6000, and the Xerox 720-XJ. (Note that all these printers have the same list price, $349.99). We would like to know which printer you think is likely to be the best. In the near future, someone from the Department will call you and verify the reasons for your choice. You may also be invited to participate in a focus group along with other students and faculty in order to discuss these four printers. (NB. You will be paid to participate in this focus group). Please write your name and telephone number so that you can be contacted.

Name ______________________________ Phone ____________________

Now you may turn the page and read the product information. After you have read all the information, you may write down what you think of these printers and choose which printer you feel is likely to be the best choice. After you have chosen, you may complete the rest of the experiment. Thank you for your assistance.

APPENDIX C
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 2

Instructions: Accountability Real Brands Condition

The Marketing Department is planning to buy several personal computers and computer printers for instructional use. We would like to compare students' preferences with those of the marketing professors. In this booklet, you have been given some information about four IBM-compatible printers, that are being considered by the Department. These are the Epson DQ-570, the IBM PX 2390, the Star QuickPrinter 6000, and the Xerox 720-XJ. We would like to know which printer you think is likely to be the best. (All these printers have about the same list price, $350, so in this case, price is of no consideration)

For your information, people do not generally prefer one of these printers over the others. For example, four marketing professors were given information about these four printers, and were asked to make a recommendation. There was no agreement. One professor wanted the department to buy the Epson DQ-570, another, the IBM PX 2390, a third, the Star QuickPrinter 6000, and the fourth, the Xerox 720-XJ.

Now we would like to see what students think of these printers. In the likely event that there is disagreement, someone from the Department will call you and verify the reasons for your choice. You may also be invited to participate in a focus group along with other students and faculty in order to discuss these four printers. (NB. You will be paid to participate in this focus group). Please write your name and telephone number so that you can be contacted.

Name ____________________________ Phone _____________________

After I have finished reading these instructions, you may turn the page and read the product information. After you have read all the information, you may write down what you think of these printers and choose which printer you feel is likely to be the best choice. After you have chosen, you may complete the rest of the questionnaire. Thank you for your assistance.

Instructions: Accountability Fictitious Brands Condition

The Marketing Department is planning to buy several personal computers and computer printers for instructional use. We would like to compare students' preferences with those of the marketing professors. In this booklet, you have been given some information about four IBM-compatible printers, that are being considered by the Department. These are the Alpha, the Beta, the Gamma, and the Delta. (These are real brands whose names have been disguised because people often favor brands that they own). We would like to know which printer you think is likely to be the best. (All these printers have about the same list price, $350, so in this case, price is of no consideration)

For your information, people do not generally prefer one of these printers over the others. For example, four marketing professors were given information about these four printers, and were asked to make a recommendation. There was no agreement. One professor wanted the department to buy the Alpha, another, the Beta, a third, the Gamma, and the fourth, the Delta.

Now we would like to see what students think of these printers. In the likely event that there is disagreement, someone from the Department will call you and verify the reasons for your choice. You may also be invited to participate in a focus group along with other students and faculty in order to discuss these four printers. (NB. You will be paid to participate in this focus group). Please write your name and telephone number so that you can be contacted.

Name ______________________ Phone __________________

After I have finished reading these instructions, you may turn the page and read the product information. After you have read all the information, you may write down what you think of these printers and choose which printer you feel is likely to be the best choice. After you have chosen, you may complete the rest of the questionnaire. Thank you for your assistance

Instructions: No Accountability Real Brands Condition

We would like your personal opinions about four computer printer brands. Your individual opinions are very important because your responses will be shared with manufacturers, and will let them know what product features and benefits you feel are important. On the next few pages, you will see some information about these four printers, the Epson DQ-570, the IBM PX 2390, the Star QuickPrinter 6000, and the Xerox 720-XJ. We would like to know which printer you think is likely to be the best printer. (All these printers have about the same list price, $350, so in this case, price is of no consideration).

For your information, people do not generally prefer one of these printers over the others. For example, four marketing professors were given information about these four printers and were asked to make a recommendation. There was no agreement. One professor liked the Epson DQ-570, another, the IBM PX 2390, a third, the Star QuickPrinter 6000, and the fourth, the Xerox 720-XJ.

The purpose of this experiment, however, is to see what students think of these printers and what features students prefer. After I have finished reading these instructions, you may turn the page and start reading the information about these products. After you have read all the information, you may write down what you think of these computers and choose which printer you think is likely to be the best choice. After you have chosen, you may complete the rest of the questionnaire.

We want your responses to be completely anonymous. Please do not write your name or any form of identification on the questionnaire. Thank you for your assistance.

Instructions: No Accountability Fictitious Brands Condition

We would like your personal opinions about four computer printer brands. Your individual opinions are very important because your responses will be shared with manufacturers, and will let them know what product features and benefits you feel are important. On the next few pages, you will see some information about these four printers, the Alpha, the Beta, the Gamma, and the Delta. (These are real brands whose names have been disguised because people often favor brands that they own). We would like to know which printer you think is likely to be the best printer. (All these printers have about the same list price, $350, so in this case, price is of no consideration).

For your information, people do not generally prefer one of these printers over the others. For example, four marketing professors were given information about these four printers and were asked to make a recommendation. There was no agreement. One professor liked the Alpha, another, the Beta, a third, the Gamma, and the fourth, the Delta.

The purpose of this experiment, however, is to see what students think of these printers and what features students prefer. After I have finished reading these instructions, you may turn the page and start reading the information about these products. After you have read all the information, you may write down what you think of these computers and choose which printer you think is likely to be the best choice. After you have chosen, you may complete the rest of the questionnaire.

We want your responses to be completely anonymous. Please do not write your name or any form of identification on the questionnaire. Thank you for your assistance.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Manuel Cosmas Pontes was born January 26, 1958, in Bombay, India. He received his Bachelor of Science in chemistry from the University of Bombay in 1978 and was awarded a National Science Talent Award by the National Council of Education, Research, and Training, India. Next, he joined the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, from which he graduated at the top of the class of 1980 with a Master of Science in chemistry. Manuel then moved to San Diego, California, where he pursued a Ph.D. in biochemistry from the University of California, San Diego. After the completion of his Ph.D. in 1986, Manuel spent the next two years doing postdoctoral research in neurobiology at Harvard Medical School, Boston. In 1988 he joined the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for a Ph.D. in marketing, and transferred to the University of Florida where he expects to receive a Ph. D. 1993. Manuel married Nancy Hurley in April, 1992, and they plan to relocate to Madison, New Jersey, where he has accepted a position as an assistant professor of marketing at Fairleigh Dickinson University.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Joseph W. Alba, Chairman
Associate Professor of Marketing

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

John G. Lynch, Jr.
Graduate Research Professor of Marketing

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

J. Wesley Hutchinson
Associate Professor of Marketing

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Barry R. Schlenker
Professor of Psychology

This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Marketing in the College of Business and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December, 1993

Dean, Graduate School